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Abstract: 
This article assesses the sustainability potential of the urban water sector in Europe following 
its modernisation. The analysis uses the theoretical framework of institutional resource 
regimes. This interpretative framework provides us with a typology of natural resource 
governance systems based on their coherence and their extent. Then, based on the interplay of 
hypothesis and conjecture, the framework is used to deduce the capacity of a regime to 
provide sustainable governance. We conclude that modernisation offers a path for progress 
which though necessary is not sufficient. This pessimistic assessment is based mainly on the 
observation of a lack of coherence in urban water systems in Europe. The study is divided into 
three parts: description of the modernisation process; presentation of the interpretative 
framework used in analysing institutional resource regimes; application of the framework to 
the urban water sector in Europe. 
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Institutions play a determining role in the performance of a particular economic sector. 
The modernisation of the urban water sector in Europe provides an example of a 
regulation/re-regulation process implemented within an institutional framework. This case is 
specific because of a strong environmental constraint on the governance process. It offers an 
illustration where governance and sustainability meet. 
More precisely, public authorities provide urban water governance through standards 
and public policies. Analysis of this governance has already led to the definition of a 
European model of water management and the identification of its constituent parts in terms 
of national variations (Correia, 1998; Finger et al., 2007; Grossi et al., 2010; Ménard and 
Peeroo, 2011). For two decades, this institutional framework has been evolving in order to 
meet the requirements of the sustainability objective (Kallis and Butler, 2001; Barraqué, 2003, 
2012; Wright and Fritsch, 2011). Instrumental in this institutional change has been the 
emergence of new technical standards, the Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive 
(UWWTD), and the Water Framework Directive (WFD). Following this re-regulation of the 
urban water sector, the question of the effectiveness of these changes needs to be examined. 
To gain insights in this area we adopt an approach in terms of urban water systems in Europe 
(UWSE), which provides us with a broader subject of study than the classic definition of the 
urban water sector used in economics (Bolognesi, 2012). A UWSE provides a means of 
interaction between the stakeholders in an urban water cycle and the institutions that 
coordinate them. This approach puts the institutional dimension of governance at the heart of 
the system and takes into account the interactions between the standard economic 
characteristics and the institutional components. 
The approaches used in rational choice institutionalism provide an analytical 
framework capable of taking these interactions into account but they avoid the conflict 
dimension of urban water uses and do not adequately address the question of sustainability 
(Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1993; Saleth and Dinar, 2004, 2005, 2008; Ménard and Peeroo, 
2011). The approaches adopted in historical and/or sociological institutionalism reintegrate 
conflictual aspects into the analysis but their contingency dimension reduces the predictive 
power of the results (Klink and Petit, 2005; Zuindeau, 2007; Renou, 2010). We therefore use 
an alternative approach based on institutional resource regimes (IRR) that has been developed 
with a view to determining the potential for sustainability of regulation of natural resources 
(Kissling-Näf and Kuks, 2004; Knoepfel, 2007; Gerber et al., 2009; Garin and Barraqué, 
2012). This interpretative framework provides us with a typology of natural resource 
governance systems based on their coherence and their extent. Then, based on the interplay of 
hypothesis and conjecture, the framework is used to deduce the capacity of a regime to 
provide sustainable governance. The IRR approach thus makes it possible to determine to 
what degree UWSE modernisation leads to a form of governance conducive to 
producing a sustainable path. Results of the analysis show that the modernisation of urban 
water systems in Europe does not lead to sufficient change in urban water management to 
achieve a sustainable process. This pessimistic assessment is based mainly on the observation 
of a lack of coherence in urban water systems in Europe. 
To better understand how the study reaches this conclusion, the present paper is 
divided into three parts. The first part reviews the underlying principles and the development 
of the governance framework for the UWSE. The second part presents the analytical grid used 
in examining the IRR, while the third part assesses the sustainability prospects of European 
urban water systems. 
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I. THE COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF UWSE MODERNISATION: TECHNICAL 
STANDARDISATION AND LIBERAL GOVERNANCE  
The impact of the European Union on urban water system management in Europe is 
becoming increasingly marked, particularly following the introduction of the subsidiarity 
principle. European regulation is becoming an increasingly significant factor in national water 
rights in EU countries and is thus one of the main components of UWSE management. This 
regulation was formally introduced on 6 May 1968 with the first European Water Charter and 
has undergone several phases in its development (Fig. 1). Thus, analysing the development of 
regulation enables us to characterise the modernisation process dealt with in this article. In our 
analysis of the different chronologies dealing with European regulation of water resources and 
associated activities (Kallis and Butler, 2001; Kaika, 2003), we refer in particular to the study 
by Allouche et al. (2008). This chronology is based on the European research programme 
Euromarket (2003-2005) and brings it up to date. Furthermore, this approach to the subject 
differs little from that used in the other analyses cited. European regulation can be divided 
into three phases, or generations: [1973-1988]; [1988-1995]; [1995- present day]. The third 
phase represents the modernisation discussed in this article.  
During the first regulation phase, the European Union introduced rules aimed at 
controlling the quality of the resource and limiting the impact on uses, mainly through 
drinking water standards and pollution thresholds. This type of regulation controls the 
immission of polluting substances
1
, and is in line with two of the European political 
objectives of that time: harmonisation of environmental rules, with a view to facilitating trade 
in particular, and protection of public health (Kallis and Nijkamp, 2000). The rules resulting 
from the second phase continued this effort and completed it by dealing directly with the 
sources of pollution and targeting specific sectors (urban water, etc.). Regulation took the 
form of a command and control system focussing then on the sources of emissions that 
degrade the resource. This pollution control was aimed at meeting environmental protection 
objectives and not simply with protecting uses. It should be noted that these two generations 
of regulations are anthropocentric, even though the second leaves a little more room for 
environmental concerns (Euromarket, 2003). 
Finally, the third and current phase of regulation represents a paradigm shift with 
respect to the preceding periods. Rather than continuing to manage the resource and its uses in 
a selective and sector-based manner, the European Union began to promote integrated water 
resources management (IWRM). The objectives remain environmental but achieving them 
must remain compatible with the development of human activities. The implementation of 
means to achieve sustainable development is at the heart of this generation of regulations, and 
the European Water Framework Directive (WFD) spells out the fundamental principles. 
  
                                                 
1
 “Immission” refers to the concentration of pollutants in the water, while “emission” refers to the action 
of diffusing pollutants in the water. In the first case, emphasis is on the host environment of pollutants; in the 
second, it is their source.  
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Fig. 1: Main laws and regulations concerning water standards enacted at European level  
Text Year Objective 
Generation 1 
European Water 
Charter 
1968 1
st
 European instrument dealing with water 
Directive 
75/440/EEC 
1975 Surface water 
Directive 
76/464/EEC 
1976 Dangerous substances  
Directive 80/68/EEC 1980 Groundwater 
Directive 
80/778/EEC 
1980 Quality of water intended for human consumption (revised by 98/83/EC) 
Generation 2 
Directive 
91/271/EEC 
1991 Urban waste water 
Directive 
91/462/EEC 
1991  Guidelines for a pan-European water resources management policy (supply and 
quality) 
Directive 
91/676/EEC 
1991 Nitrates from agricultural sources 
Recommendation 
1224 
1993 Protection and management of fresh water resources (this originated in the 
Freshwater Europe action programme) 
Recommendation 
1232 
1994 Water resources and agriculture 
Generation 3 
Directive 96/61/EC 1996 Integrated pollution prevention and control  
Directive 98/38/EC 1998 Quality of water intended for human consumption 
Resolution 1222 2000 Water resources and agriculture 
Recommendation 
1471 
2000 Link between science and technology to balance supply and demand, especially 
in the Mediterranean basin.  
Directive 
2000/60/EC 
2000 Water Framework Directive (amended by decision 2455/2001/EC and directives 
2008/32/EC; 2008/105/EC; 2009/31/EC) 
European Water 
Charter 
2001 European water resources charter (replacing charter of 1968) 
Directive 
2004/17/EC 
2004 Public procurement in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors 
Directive 2006/7/EC 2006 Quality of bathing water 
Directive 
2006/11/EC 
2006 Pollution caused by certain dangerous substances 
Directive 
2006/118/EC 
2006 Protection of groundwater 
Directive 
2008/105/EC 
2008 Environmental quality standards  
Directive 
2010/75/EU 
2010 Industrial emissions: Integrated pollution prevention and control 
This chronology reveals a change in European regulations in both substance and form. 
European regulations on water developed firstly by taking into consideration specific 
problems as they arose (agriculture, quality, technology, urban water, etc.) and then proposing 
procedural rules. Following this, an effort was made to link the different problems so that a 
holistic approach to water management could gradually be put in place. Thus in 1991, 
Directive 462 drew up guidelines for pan-European water management which were followed 
by sectoral recommendations, such as in 1993 and 1994 with recommendations 1224 and 
1232, dealing respectively with resource protection and water and agriculture. Again in 1991, 
the UWWTD imposed obligations regarding the collection and treatment of wastewater and 
acted directly on the management of UWSEs. In 2000, the WFD introduced new water 
management principles in Europe and became the main element in the third phase of the 
development of European regulations. Its novelty lay in the assumption of a positive 
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correlation between methods of governance, in particular those recommended by new public 
management, and protection of the environment (Fig. 2). However, the directive evolved in 
function of the constraints observed during implementation and was amended in 2001, 2008 
and 2009. 
Fig. 2: European principles of water management contained in WFD 
1. “Water is not a commercial product like any other, but, rather, a heritage which must be protected and 
defended”. 
2. “Sustainable use of water”, “take into account the vulnerability of aquatic ecosystems”. 
3. Good quality, strengthening of water protection standards: “good ecological status within a period of 15 
years” (any exception must be justified). 
4. Quantity: calculation of minimum discharge of rivers, for example, on basis of amount of water that can be 
abstracted while respecting the requirements of aquatic areas (abandonment of water requirements of different 
users, industry, agriculture, drinking water, etc).  
5. “Polluter pays” principle. 
6. “Water pays for water” principle. 
7. Governance based on districts corresponding to river basins or catchment areas 
8. … based on user participation on catchment area committees. 
Source: Gilles Massardier, 2011: 12. 
In this article, we consider that the paradigm shift brought about by the third 
generation of regulations is providing impetus to the modernisation of urban water services in 
Europe. The study therefore focuses on this period and, among all the rules promulgated, 
gives paramount importance to the WFD
2
. The WFD is in line with an anthropocentric 
approach to sustainable development; it protects the resource both qualitatively and 
quantitatively but without neglecting economic efficiency. This ambition to integrate the three 
pillars of sustainable development is reflected in the essential principles of the directive such 
as integrated management based on river basins, attainment of good ecological status, and 
incentives to set up public-private partnerships (PPP). In addition, the WFD also breaks with 
the old European standards concerning methods of regulation. As illustrated by the objective 
of attaining good ecological status for the resource, management results remain important, but 
now management procedures are also imposed and recommended, such as implementation of 
the “polluter pays” principle (Moss, 2004). The modernisation of water management practices 
promotes a form of water governance that is no longer concerned only with protection of the 
resource and its uses. 
In support of this observation, it may be noted that article 9.1 of the WFD states that 
“water-pricing policies provide adequate incentives for users to use water resources 
efficiently, and thereby contribute to the environmental objectives of this Directive”. The 
WFD uses economic incentives and market mechanisms to organise management of the 
sector. Modernisation of the water sector is a continuation of the movement to liberalise all 
network infrastructures begun in the 1990s (Finger et al., 2007). The structure of the market 
makes it difficult to ensure atomicity among suppliers in a limited spatial area. Thus, in 
Europe the search for efficiency in the water sector resulted in an organisation based on the 
theory of contestable markets (Baumol, 1982) and de-integration of the sector (Demsetz, 
1987). The contestability of markets should ensure an optimal allocation of resources while 
de-integration would produce new spaces in which competition can take place. Operators 
                                                 
2
 All normative and preparatory acts, and those relating to water management and protection in Europe, 
can be accessed via http://eur-lex.europa.eu/fr/dossier/dossier_61.htm#1, consulted on 10-09-2012.  
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would become legal entities under private law, instead of and in the place of public 
monopolies. 
UWSE modernisation is therefore based on a multiplication of technical standards 
ensuring preservation of the resource and protection of its uses as well as on a set of rules 
favouring the privatisation and liberalisation of the sector so as to improve the efficiency of 
governance. This modernisation may be seen as the combination of the pursuit of 
environmental objectives (protection and preservation) and rationalisation of the governance 
process (privatisation and liberalisation). The process gives impetus to two dynamics of urban 
water management in Europe: an increase in standardisation and a liberal approach. By 
reconciling these two dynamics, the European authorities hope to organise the sustainable 
management of urban water resources. We may therefore identify a common basis for a 
European model of water management, even though infra-European diversity may also be 
observed (between the German, French and English models). This diversity takes the form of 
variations of the European model and is reflected in the different institutional forms observed 
in the implementation of these shared principles (Finger et al. 2007; Ménard, Peeroo, 2011). 
Two factors explain the polymorphism of the European water management model: the 
different legal backgrounds of the countries concerned and the variety of 
definitions/perceptions of a public service (Lorrain, 2005). 
Having presented the main characteristics of the modernisation of UWSEs, noting 
their common aspects as well as their variations, we will now take a closer look at the IRR 
research programme.  
II. IRR RESEARCH PROGRAMME: COMBINING PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS AND 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONALISM  
To obtain a clear understanding of the analytical framework of IRRs before applying it 
to UWSE modernisation, it is important to first examine its foundations (II.1), and then its 
capacity to describe (II.2) and predict (II.3). 
II.1 ANALYTICAL BASES: AN EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL CRITIQUE OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES IN EUROPE  
The IRR research programme is underpinned by an empirical and theoretical critique 
of European environmental policies (Knoepfel and Nahrath, 2005; Knoepfel, 2007; Gerber et 
al., 2009). The empirical evaluation is based on the study on environmental history by 
McNeill (2000), which provides a diagnostic analysis of environmental degradation and the 
non-sustainable path of human development. Based on this historical analysis, the advocates 
of IRRs distinguish between different conceptions of environmental policies and point out the 
paradox that exists among them. 
The first, so-called classical, conception is the least sustainable and “confines itself to 
reasoning in terms of limiting the emission of pollutants”[Transl] (Knoepfel and Nahrath, 
2005: 207). The second conception attributes the objective of sustainable development to 
environmental policies: this involves reconciling the economic, ecological and social 
requirements relating to a resource. This type of policy represents progress in relation to the 
first approach, but it has proved to be not entirely satisfactory. “Sustainability policies” are 
focused on “the conditions for allocating the quantities of resources exploited” [Transl] with 
a view to meeting the requirements mentioned above (idem: 207). This logic presupposes a 
fairly abundant quantity of resources to ensure the production of goods and services 
demanded. In addition, as we have seen with the classical approach to policy, standards only 
restrict immissions and emissions of pollutants. Consequently, an “ecologically clean 
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overexploitation of the resource” [Transl] may occur and the development path of different 
uses may become non-sustainable (ibidem: 208). Following criticism of the environmental 
policies resulting from these two conceptions, a third conception was proposed in order to 
genuinely coordinate uses in a sustainable manner. The authors maintain that the effectiveness 
of environmental policies hinges on the distinction between resource sustainability and 
resource use (Gerber et al., 2009). We refer to this third conception by using the term 
“distinctive sustainable policies”. 
From a theoretical standpoint, a public policy approach comes up against one major 
limitation. It only considers the resource through sectoral analyses that are independent of 
each other, so that it is difficult to obtain an overall understanding of resource problems 
(Knoepfel and Nahrath, 2005; Knoepfel, 2007; Gerber et al., 2009). This limitation stems 
from the actual conception of public policies that tend to separate the issues identified. 
Institutional economics provides an analytical framework for identifying the links between 
different public policies, namely through notions of coordination and institutional 
arrangements. Based on the work of Bromley (1991, 1992) and Ostrom (1990, 2002), the IRR 
research programme postulates that there is compatibility between the analysis of public 
policies and institutional economics. Enhanced by the complementarity of the two 
approaches, the research programme goes beyond the theoretical limits outlined above.   
These opening remarks help characterise the IRR approach. It is an approach 
combining public policy analysis and institutional economics that is specific to the study of 
natural resources management. More particularly, it questions the sustainability of the 
management practices used for a resource and related goods and services. Its axiomatic nature 
limits the field of study to those territories in which the formal rules are the principal source 
of regulation, in other words essentially the OECD countries. This focus on the written rule 
makes it possible to identify the main factors motivating and governing the choices of actors 
participating in UWSEs (Bolognesi, 2012). Furthermore, the work of the AFD, the French 
Development Agency, using data on national institutional profiles, confirms the relevance of 
restricting the analysis to the formal rules in OECD countries by showing the high degree of 
formalisation of regulation systems (Meisel and Ould-Aoudia, 2007).  
II.2 OBJECTIVE OF IRRS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF POSITIVE ECONOMICS: 
IDENTIFICATION OF WAYS OF REGULATING A NATURAL RESOURCE  
An IRR is a means of governance of the uses of a given natural resource in a defined 
territory. In other words, it is the sum of public policies and property rights regulating the uses 
of a resource (Kissling-Näf and Kuks, 2004; Knoepfel and Nahrath, 2005; Gerber et al., 
2009). In terms of positive economics, the objective of IRRs is to identify the governance 
mechanisms at work in regulating a natural resource. Consequently, it focuses on public 
policies and the structure of property rights. All these regulatory instruments are brought 
together in the two components of an IRR, respectively the policy design and the regulatory 
system for public policies and property rights. The weight of the two components in the 
regulation structure varies from one IRR to another, making it possible to distinguish between 
regimes that are organised essentially through the structure of property rights and those for 
which public policies are the main means of coordination. 
Policy design comprises six elements and public policies give it concrete form (Knoepfel and 
Nahrath, 2005). The six elements are as follows: 
1. Definition of problem and collective objectives; 
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2. Causality model3; 
3. Public policy stakeholders: targets, beneficiaries and political and 
administrative actors;  
4. Policy instruments; 
5. Political and administrative arrangements; 
6. Outputs. 
Policy design results in the formulation of a public policy that will impact on the uses of the 
resource. In the context of IRRs, an understanding of public policies is obtained via a study of 
public law
4
, considered to be the formal manifestation of public policies. Finally, policy 
design and public policies help define use rights for the resource. The second component of 
an IRR, the regulatory system, groups together formal property rights over the resource as 
well as the use and disposal rights which result from these
5
. Private law
6
, corresponding to the 
French civil code, is a formal manifestation of the rights of the regulatory system. Thus, 
property rights come from the regulatory system while usage rights are jointly defined by the 
regulatory system and policy design (in general, public policies limit or refine the usage rights 
allocated. 
The possibilities for combining these two components are numerous and four different 
ways of regulating resources can be identified (Knoepfel and Nahrath, 2005; Gerber et al., 
2009), based on the impact of the policy design and the regulatory system on property and 
usage rights. Type 1 regulation has no impact on the system of rights and essentially involves 
the creation of incentive mechanisms. Type 2 has a limited impact on the structure of rights 
through the use of ex post specifications or restrictions on the allocation of rights. Type 3 
modifies the breadth and content of rights through a redefinition of the institution of formal 
property, for example, via an amendment to the civil code. Finally, type 4 procedures redefine 
the allocation structure of property titles, for example through privatisation. 
II.3 OBJECTIVE IN TERMS OF NORMATIVE ECONOMICS: DEFINITION OF AN INTEGRATED 
IRR FOR SUSTAINABLE GOVERNANCE  
The normative objective of IRRs is to formulate recommendations to improve the 
sustainability of resource regulation systems. The procedures for attaining this objective are 
logically structured around three analytical steps: identification of the scope of an IRR, its 
classification, and the formulation of hypotheses linking the characteristics of an IRR to its 
sustainability potential. The notions of “extent” and “coherence” define the scope of an IRR. 
The extent refers to the number of goods and services regulated by an IRR at any given time. 
To evaluate it, these goods and services have been listed for different natural resources, 
including water (Knoepfel et al., 2001). The ratio between the extent observed and all the 
goods and services used gives the relative extent of the IRR. When the ratio is less than 1, it 
indicates the possibility of non-regulated rivalries, while a ratio of above 1 suggests over-
                                                 
3
 A model of causality identifies the actors responsible for the problem of collective action and the 
mechanisms capable of modifying their behaviour in the manner recommended by element 1. The model also 
takes into account element 3 (stakeholders) and 4 (instruments) of the policy design. 
4
 The authors are aware that the distinction between private and public law appears clear in traditional 
Roman law but less so in common law legal systems (Knoepfel and Nahrath, 2005; Varone et al., 2008; Gerber 
et al., 2009). 
In legal systems based on Roman law, public law governs interactions between private actors and the 
State.   
5
 Roman law distinguishes between right of disposal and right of use (usus, abusus, fructus). The right 
of disposal, (right to sell – abusus) applies to the transfer of the resource, while usus refers to the right of use and 
the prerogatives relating to the modification of the resource contained in the abusus. 
6
 In legal systems based on Roman law, private law governs interactions between private actors. 
9 
 
regulation. The coherence of an IRR relates to the content of the different sources of 
regulation of an IRR and the coordination between them (Gerber et al., 2009). Three forms of 
coherence may be distinguished. Coherence within the policy design ensures compatibility 
between its six elements, on the one hand, and between the different public policies on the 
other. Coherence within the regulatory system means that property rights are clearly defined 
and non-contradictory. Finally, external coherence reflects a satisfactory link between the two 
components of the IRR, for example correspondence between target groups and holders of 
rights under the regulatory system. 
Based on the extent and coherence characteristics of an IRR, a typology can be 
proposed distinguishing four possible IRR forms: non-existent, simple, complex and 
integrated (Kissling-Näf and Kuks, 2004; Knoepfel and Nahrath, 2005;Knoepfel, 2007; 
Gerber et al., 2009) (Fig. 3). A non-existent RIR indicates the absence of any form of usage 
regulation for the resource. A simple IRR reflects emerging regulation for a resource, where 
only a limited number of goods and services (among those actually used) have so far been 
regulated, but in a coherent manner (the sources of incoherence being reduced). An IRR 
becomes complex when most of the goods and services used are regulated but in a way that is 
not very coherent. Finally, an integrated IRR indicates the coherent regulation of all the goods 
and services used. Empirical evidence shows this form occurs mainly when regulation is 
public or is administered by a powerful stakeholder representing collective interests (Knoepfel 
and Nahrath, 2005). Each IRR studied is classified according to this typology. 
Fig.3: Typology of IRRs according to their extent and coherence  
 
Source: Gerber et al., 2009 : 806. 
Finally, and in our opinion this represents the major contribution of the IRR, 
conjectures may be made on the causality between the extent and coherence of an IRR, on the 
Extent 
Coherence 
Complex 
IRR 
 
Non-existent 
IRR 
 
Simple 
IRR 
 
Integrated 
IRR 
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one hand, and the sustainability potential, on the other
7
. The first conjecture suggests that the 
move towards an integrated form increases the potential for sustainability and leads to two 
sub-conjectures, each specific to the extent and coherence of the IRR. The second conjecture 
relates to the evolution of an IRR. It establishes a positive causality between the level of threat 
to a resource, its perception as an issue of collective action and, consequently, the expansion 
and greater coherence of the IRR. This interplay of conjectures completes the normative 
objective of the research programme of the IRRs, by which the sustainable use of a resource is 
attained through an increase in the extent and coherence of regulation. The approach thus 
makes sustainability a central objective in the governance of a natural resource and supports 
the need to build an integrated IRR. 
Having presented the subject of analysis and the theoretical elements, we will now re-
integrate empiricism in the analytical framework with the aim of gaining insights into the 
prospects for sustainability of UWSEs following their modernisation.  
III. THE LIMITED SUSTAINABILITY POTENTIAL OF UWSES: COMPLEX IRRS 
Identification of the scope of UWSEs helps evaluate their potential for sustainability. 
Extent appears large (III.1) while coherence seems to be insufficient (III.2). 
III.1 MODERNISATION AS A STEP TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY: A FACTOR IN THE 
EXPANSION OF UWSES 
By interpreting UWSE modernisation by means of the analytical framework presented 
earlier we conclude firstly that the extent of the UWSE is large and, secondly, that two 
different processes are at the origin of this large coverage (Fig. 4). The first process relates to 
the classic development of technical standardisation, which we refer to as expansion through 
regulatory measures. The second process concerns the change in the form of urban water 
supply services, which we qualify as processual. We will now discuss this expansion in terms 
of both its form and dynamic. 
Technical standardisation of water uses meant that the extent of UWSEs was increased 
as a result of the introduction of regulatory measures. This dynamic process stems from the 
multiplication of standards on processes, emissions and immissions, produced essentially by 
the public authorities with a view to regulating water uses and their impacts (Barraqué, 2003). 
By looking at the timeline of European regulations we can see the direction taken by the 
regulatory process and the change in the actual purpose of control measures.  Originally, 
technical standards served as health objectives and, generally speaking, restricted the 
immission of polluting substances into the resource. Following this, an environmental 
objective to protect the actual resource, with corresponding emission standards, was 
introduced, leading to a further increase in extent. At the same time, the identification of 
particularly sensitive areas encouraged the creation of technical standards specific to targeted 
sectors, as illustrated in the tables of the UWWTD in the Appendix. Finally, during 
modernisation, the attempt to harmonise practices, etc., resulted in the emergence of 
                                                 
7
 In our opinion, and based on the epistemology of Lakatos (1978), these conjectures constitute both a 
cornerstone and a stumbling block of the research programme, a cornerstone because they establish the 
originality and the major contribution of the corpus, and a stumbling block because, given that the conjectures 
are not demonstrated, the normative and predictive objective of the IRRs appears unstable. However, experience 
has neither refuted the conclusions nor falsified the research programme. This therefore enables us to use IRRs 
with caution. The apparent shortcomings of the research programme are a reflection of its relatively recent 
beginnings and indicate that it is still maturing, while the development of its positive heuristic constitutes a 
major element in its future progression.  
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procedural standards governing actual uses (obligation of water treatment techniques, for 
example) and no longer simply objectives in terms of results. In addition, the reason for 
control measures has also evolved. Increased market power and the presence of private actors 
in the supply of urban water services forced public authorities, in a more systematic manner, 
to supervise activity by means of standards in order to remedy any possible negative 
externalities and to maintain general interest in the resource. 
The second dynamic whereby UWSE regulation is increased, which we call 
processual expansion, is a direct consequence of the application of the principles of 
governance incorporated in the modernisation process. Thus, modernisation gives impetus to 
changes in UWSE regulation methods, two of which appear essential. First, the 
encouragement given to PPPs, and to privatisation in general, led to a redefinition of the 
allocation structure of property rights (type 4 regulation), the privatisation of English RWAs 
in 1989 being the most symptomatic example. Second, generalisation of the use of economic 
instruments with a view to “rationalisation” of management increased the importance of type 
1 regulation in UWSE governance. The modification in substance or form of these two types 
of regulation encouraged the liberal orientation of modernisation, as underlined in the first 
part. It attributes increasing importance to the market, but coordination through the market 
implies recourse to formal regulation. 
Market trading requires firstly the existence and/or definition of property rights and 
then takes place by means of contracts drawn up between the stakeholders. Thus we maintain 
that liberal regulation and market supply of urban water services in essence increases the 
goods and services formally regulated in UWSEs. In this sense, modernisation of UWSE 
governance increases the extent of the IRR by its very nature. In particular, it results in a high 
relative extent since all the good and services used will be formally regulated by the market. 
Fig. 4: The two dynamics of expansion contained in the modernisation of UWSE 
 Expansion through regulatory 
measures 
Processual expansion 
Definition Increase of binding rules issued by 
public authorities 
Increase of rules related to the 
implementation of governance 
principles 
Sources -Public intervention (welfare state) 
-Control on UWSE economic 
activity 
-Implementation of coordination 
conditions different from authority  
Operating mechanisms -Formulation of technical 
standards, etc. 
-Property rights formalization 
-Contractual coordination  
Types of regulation concern Type 2 -Type 4 (mostly) 
-Type 1 
Impact on extent Absolute extent Relative extent: uses require 
existence of specific rules 
Knowing that the extent of urban water systems in Europe is high makes it possible to 
better characterise them using the IRR typology and to provide an interim opinion on their 
sustainability potential. First, among the four forms of IRR, only the complex and integrated 
types have a high extent. UWSEs therefore belong to one of these two categories and the 
forthcoming analysis of their coherence will enable us to determine which one. Second, by 
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virtue of conjecture 1.1 linking extent and sustainability, we may assume that modernisation 
exerts a beneficial effect on the sustainability of a UWSE by increasing its extent and 
ensuring a high degree of relative extent. Thus far, the coherence dimension is decisive in 
determining the overall sustainability potential that modernisation confers on the UWSE. 
III.2 PERSISTENCE OF INCONSISTENCIES IN REGULATION AS A LIMIT TO INTEGRATION 
OF THE IRR  
Analysis of IRR coherence involves studying the coherence of both policy design and 
the regulatory system, as well as their cross-coherence. To carry out this analysis, we sought 
to identify inconsistencies and malfunctions. Ultimately, the results confirm the conjecture 
that inconsistencies subsist despite the acknowledged modern-day attempts to put an end to 
these limits to sustainability by harmonising European water management principles.     
The regulatory system appears to be the most coherent component of UWSEs, which 
can be largely explained by the choice of study area. As pointed out in the opening remarks of 
the second part, European territories are particularly suited to an analysis in terms of IRR 
thanks to the mostly formal regulation systems. This long tradition of coordination around 
property rights has made it possible to put in place a set of institutions and organisations 
capable of ensuring the coherence − in the IRR sense − of the regulatory system. The 
development goes with the development of the rule of law and the public bureaucracy 
(Brousseau, Schemeil and Sgard, 2010: 254). Nevertheless, it should be stressed that internal 
coherence of the regulatory system is not necessarily equivalent to stable and clear 
management at the time of interaction between stakeholders. Indeed, the multiplication of 
stakeholders also generates uncertainty in strategic areas and the possibility of conflict, but 
thanks to internal coherence such problems can be settled subsequently. The analyses of 
Bakker (2000; 2010) on the privatisation of the English sector illustrate this remark, as does, 
in a more concrete fashion, the management of the 1995 drought in England
8
. 
The policy design of UWSE modernisation suffers from more internal inconsistencies 
than the regulatory system. The two main indicators are the debate on how to attain good 
ecological status and, more generally, how to ensure conformity of local management systems 
with European directives. The objective of achieving good ecological status of water by 2015, 
in which urban uses will play a major role, appears difficult to reach
9
. In addition, scientists 
are voicing reservations on the methods of measuring efforts and the results achieved with 
respect to their rigour, diversity and comparability, with the classification of certain water 
bodies being re-examined (Hering et al., 2010; Beniston et al., 2012). It is also true to say that 
ensuring conformity with management methods recommended by the WFD is not always an 
easy matter (Wright and Fritsch, 2011), as we saw for example with German reticence 
towards privatisation. Thus, coordination between the different levels of UWSE governance is 
characterised by malfunctions that reduce the coherence of the policy design for 
modernisation. Nevertheless, mention should be made of the European readjustments: the 
WFD has been amended three times, going so far as to bring more flexibility to external 
funding possibilities in the water sector. 
                                                 
8
 This drought revealed that the system of price-capping had not encouraged operators to invest 
sufficiently in infrastructure development so as to maintain the balance between supply and demand (Bakker, 
2000). Later, the regulatory authorities and the State sent out new price signals to remedy this shortcoming.  
9
 All the reports of member countries of the European Commission are available at: 
http://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/water/reporting-obligations, consulted on 27-09-2012. For France, in 
particular, the reader may consult: http://www.rapportage.eaufrance.fr/; for England: http://www.environment-
agency.gov.uk/research/library/data/97343.aspx; for Germany, the report is available at: 
http://www.umweltdaten.de/publikationen/fpdf-l/3771.pdf.  
13 
 
The main sources of inconsistency in UWSEs lie at the interface of policy design and 
the regulatory system
10
. All the differences between the States and the European Commission 
testify to these external inconsistencies. Representing about 20 % of disputes, water is one of 
those areas that are most in breach of European environment legislation (Keller, 2011). The 
United Kingdom (56) and Germany (57) are guilty of fewer infractions than France (74), 
while Belgium has the worst record with no less than 109 infractions reported in December 
2010. To have an idea of the risks incurred, the penalties relating to French case C-280/02 
concerning urban waste water were estimated at several hundred million euros (Keller, 2007). 
The degree of coherence of UWSEs is not high, mainly because of the difficulty of 
organising a harmonious and multi-level policy. This lack of coherence appears in particular 
externally, a fact also noted by stakeholders. Members are therefore making a concerted effort 
to increase coordination among the different elements of UWSE regulation. By knowing the 
scope of a UWSE, we are able to deduce the type of IRR that it belongs to and the potential 
for sustainability that modernisation would provide.  
III.3 EXPANSION VERSUS COHERENCE: THE PARADOX OF MODERNISATION 
On the basis of the characteristics defining the scope of UWSEs, i.e. large extent and 
poor coherence, we are able to deduce the type of IRR to which they belong. The large extent 
eliminates the possibility of “non-existent” or “simple” types of IRR and the low level of 
coherence makes an “integrated” IRR unlikely. Consequently, the modernisation of water 
management in Europe is helping to shape UWSEs as “complex” IRRs (Fig. 5). The 
hypotheses relating to IRR sustainability suggest that complex IRRs are regulated by a 
governance system that does not maximise sustainability potential. Thus, as things stand, 
modernisation would not ensure that UWSEs develop with maximum sustainability potential. 
This conclusion rests on the ambivalence of modernisation. We should therefore emphasize 
the effects, both positive and negative, of expansion through regulatory measures and 
processual expansion on the sustainability of UWSEs. 
  
                                                 
10
 This is also because these inconsistencies are the most visible and identifiable. 
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Fig.5: Classifying UWSE as complex IRR 
 Low coherence High coherence 
High extent Complex IRR 
 
Impact of modernization on UWSE: 
  -multiplication of formal rules (standards, 
contracts, etc.) 
  -technical complexity 
  -decentralization and self-reliance of 
behaviors 
  
Integrated IRR 
 
Inconsistent with the low coherence of UWSE: 
  -difficulties to implement multi-level 
governance 
  -organizational frictions 
  -mild and variable efficiency of incentives 
Low extent Non-existent IRR 
 
Inconsistent with the high extent of 
UWSE: 
  -strong technical standardization 
  -property right formulation 
..-multiplication of contractual relations 
Simple IRR 
 
Inconsistent with the low coherence of UWSE: 
  -difficulties to implement multi-level 
governance 
  -organizational frictions 
  -mild and variable efficiency of incentives  
Inconsistent with the high extent of UWSE: 
  -strong technical standardization 
  -property right formulation 
..-multiplication of contractual relations 
Expansion through regulatory measures increases the total amount of regulated goods 
and services, which directly improves the sustainability potential of the systems. However, it 
reduces this potential by making the system more complex. This regulation through standards 
increases the technical complexity of supplying the services, which results in a reduction in 
system coherence. Operators find it difficult to integrate such regulation into their systems. In 
addition to this technical aspect, ensuring conformity entails a financial cost that may threaten 
the internal coherence of the policy design and the external coherence of UWSEs
11
. Faced 
with these additional costs relating to technical standardisation, the supervision and 
rationalisation of governance processes stemming from procedural regulations reduce the 
sources of financing. The principles of full cost recovery and “water pays for water” are 
examples of this problem (Barraqué, 2003). Thus, while costs increase, financing possibilities 
decrease, and the question of investment in infrastructure becomes a major problem in UWSE 
management. There is therefore an area of friction between the technical component and the 
economic/institutional component of expansion through regulatory measures. This friction 
causes regulatory incoherence and eventually diminishes the sustainability potential of 
UWSEs. Moreover, expansion through regulatory measures reinforces the tension between 
the socio-environmental and economic objectives required to achieve a sustainable 
management system for urban water services in Europe. 
                                                 
11
 This cost is not negligible since it represents the majority of the increase in costs for suppliers. It 
comes mainly from the introduction of sanitation standards and the increasing complexity of drinking water 
treatment procedures in order to comply with regulations. 
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Processual expansion has a similar effect on the sustainability of UWSEs. By recourse 
to property rights and contracts, it increases the extent of the system, ensures a relative extent 
that is at least equal to 1, and improves sustainability potential. This recourse, however, 
decreases UWSE coherence because of the characteristics of coordination through the market, 
and reduces sustainability potential. Thus, institutional economics considers that property 
rights and contracts are incomplete (Barzel, 1982; Brousseau and Nicita, 2010). This 
incompleteness implies an inability to take into account all the possible developments and 
changes in transactions and does not totally eliminate uncertainty. Coordination through the 
market does not eradicate ex ante uncertainty, so that contracts require readjustments and 
safeguard mechanisms must accompany contracts and property rights. This uncertainty leads 
to difficulties in organising the different elements of regulation and is a hindrance to the 
achievement of IRR coherence.  
It appears that the positive impact of expansion processes is counterbalanced by the 
appearance of inconsistencies that weaken the sustainability potential of UWSEs. In this 
respect, modernisation has a paradoxical effect on the sustainability potential of UWSEs. On 
the one hand, modernisation increases the extent of UWSEs by means of regulatory and 
processual expansion, while on the other hand the way in which these two mechanisms 
function generates inconsistencies and prevents complete integration of UWSEs. It therefore 
appears, at first sight, that modernisation develops the sustainability potential of water 
management in European cities by producing rules that add substance to system regulation. 
However, a more detailed look reveals that the costs of coordination associated with these 
rules do not seem to be taken into account in modernisation in its current form. This paradox 
limits the sustainability potential of management systems for urban water services in Europe. 
CONCLUSION 
The modernisation of UWSEs is characterised by an increase in technical 
standardisation and a liberal trend in governance. This article evaluates the capacity of this 
modernisation process to direct the UWSE along a sustainable development path. With this 
aim in mind, we used the analytical framework of the IRRs to assess the sustainability 
potential of UWSEs according to their extent and their coherence. The analysis reaches two 
main conclusions, the first positive, the second negative. 
First, UWSEs figure among the complex IRRs. We show that modernisation allows 
expansion through regulatory measures and processual expansion of UWSEs, which means 
that the “extent” dimension is high. However, UWSE modernisation is subject to 
malfunctions and does not manage to ensure a sufficient level of coherence to reach the status 
of an integrated IRR. We identify the main sources of this low level of coherence as being 
related to the coordination between policy design and the regulatory system, the prime cause 
of which is the difficulty of setting up a multi-level governance system. Second, 
modernisation will not provide UWSEs with a guarantee of sustainable development. The 
complex status of UWSEs means that, according to the conjectures relating to IRRs, 
sustainability potential is limited. Admittedly, since the extent dimension is high, there is less 
chance of any unsettled conflicts over use, but the lack of coherence reduces the effectiveness 
of regulation resulting from implementation of public policies and of the property rights 
system.  
Ultimately, the Europeanization of this public service does not seem to be an adequate 
solution to the problems of sustainability facing urban water systems in Europe. Moreover, it 
raises the more general question regarding the capacity of a governance system with a liberal 
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tendency to ensure a sustainable supply of natural resource-based services of general interest 
(Ostrom, 2010).  
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